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Three Tales of Scientiﬁc Success
Michela Massimi*y
Success-to-truth inferences have been the realist stronghold for a long time. Scientiﬁc suc-
cess is the parameter by which realists claim to discern approximately true theories from
false ones. But scientiﬁc success needs to be probed a bit deeper. In this article, I tell three
tales of scientiﬁc success, by considering in turn success from nowhere, success from here
now, and success from within. I argue for a suitable version of success from within that can
do justice to the historically situated nature of our scientiﬁc knowledge. The outcome is a
newway of thinking about success-to-truth inferences along perspectivalist lines.
1. Introduction. A deeply entrenched realist tradition takes truth as the
hallmark of scientiﬁc theories and scientiﬁc success as its assayer. Only a sci-
entiﬁc theory that has proved successful over time can legitimately be hall-
marked as true. Hence, success-to-truth inferences feature prominently in sci-
entiﬁc realism. Miracles aside, it is the success of the theory that speaks for its
truth. Or so the realist argument, in its vulgate, goes (see Putnam 1975).
But success-to-truth inferences come also in more sophisticated versions.
In Psillos’s (1999, 159) version, for example, Fresnel was successful (and hence
right) in identifying some of the fundamental properties of the light waves (e.g.,
that light needs a carrier and it consists of transverse waves). But he was wrong
in identifying the carrier with the molecular ether. In the structural realist ver-
sion, it is the surprising success of Fresnel’s equations (carried over in Max-
well’s theory) that speaks for the truth of Fresnel’s theory, no matter how false
the underlying hypothesis of the luminiferous ether was (Worrall 1994). And
in the real realist version (Kitcher 2001, 168–70), Fresnel’s theory was success-
ful—with Poisson’s striking prediction of a bright spot—because of its success-
*To contact the author, please write to: School of Philosophy, Psychology, and Language
Sciences, University of Edinburgh, 3 Charles Street, Edinburgh EH8 9AD, UK; e-mail:
michela.massimi@ed.ac.uk.
yThis article is part of a project that has received funding from the European Research
Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation pro-
gram (grant agreement European Consolidator Grant H2020-ERC-2014-CoG 647272
“Perspectival Realism: Science, Knowledge, and Truth from a Human Vantage Point”).
Philosophy of Science, 83 (December 2016) pp. 757–767. 0031-8248/2016/8305-0010$10.00
Copyright 2016 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.
757
ful “working posits” (e.g., electromagnetic waves of high frequency) and de-
spite its “idle wheels” (e.g., Fresnel’s false belief about the elastic ether). In
any of these realist versions, truth is inferred as the best explanation for the suc-
cess of the theory at issue. Some negative tolerance is allowed in the hallmark-
ing process. For realists of all stripes strive for approximate truth, rather than just
truth.
This picture of how scientiﬁc success assays truth from falsehood has fa-
mously been challenged via powerful arguments from the history of science.1
I will not review here the different arguments that have been leveled from his-
torically minded quarters. Instead, I start with a seemingly mundane observa-
tion. Our selective realist engagement with theories of the past is to a large
extent measured by how close (or, conversely, how far) we are from the the-
ories we are judging. Fresnel’s wave theory is still close enough to our current
electromagnetic theory. But Aristotle’s theory of motion, Ptolemy’s crystalline
spheres, or Stahl’s phlogiston theory are more alien to us when making our re-
alist judgments about truth-conducive inferences from success. The criterion of
success we thus employ in these inferences is key to our realist judgments. I
am not going to question the realist success-to-truth inferences. Instead, the
main goal of this paper is to rethink the realist criterion of success so as to ac-
commodate this mundane observation.
The observation needs some reﬁnements, to start with. First, we need what
David Harker (2013, 89) calls a “comparative conception of success.” Conﬁr-
mation theory teaches us that the available evidence may support one hypoth-
esis better than rival ones, and hence in our truth-conducive inferences we ought
to look at “theory-lineages,” as Harker calls them, to assess whether a theory is
comparatively successful (95):
HYP2. Those parts of theories that generate comparative success are approx-
imately true.
AUX. Approximately true insights will be preserved across subsequent in-
stances of theory change.
JUS2. On the basis of HYP2 and AUXwe predict that insights responsible for
comparative success will have been retained within our own scientiﬁc the-
ories. Veriﬁcation of these predictions is evidence for HYP2.
I share Harker’s comparative conception of success. But I think his analysis
falls short of addressing a central point, which transpires from the text in the
1. See Laudan (1981a) and, for more recent arguments, Stanford (2006) and Chang
(2012).
758 MICHELA MASSIMI
quote above. How do we know that approximately true insights “will be pre-
served” across theory change?
The problem concerns the indexical nature of the personal pronoun “we”
in the passage above. Does “we”mean us now? Presumably no. For we can-
not make ex post facto predictions about what approximately true insights
have been preserved in our current theories. With hindsight wisdom, we can
at best make judgments about what has been preserved (as a matter of fact,
not as a matter of prediction). Does “we”mean “they,” that is, our predeces-
sors back then? Imagine Fresnel back in 1818–21 predicting that his theoretical
insights about propagation of light waves would have been retained in future
theories because of its comparative success (vis-à-vis his rivals). Fresnel and his
contemporaries were in no better position to make such a prediction than to
predict the elimination of the ether (given how entangled propagation of light
waves was with the hypothesis of the ether back then).
Thus, a second reﬁnement to my mundane observation is in order. I suggest
rephrasing Harker’s view so that “predictions” are replaced by a posteriori judg-
ments on theoretical insights that each scientiﬁc community at any particu-
lar time may deem worthy of retaining from theories of their predecessors. This
reﬁnement tracks theory-lineages and comparative success without privileg-
ing either our current standpoint or those of our predecessors in judgments of
comparative success.
In what follows, I defend success-to-truth inferences in their historical lin-
eages. I argue that scientiﬁc success is to some extent relative to perspectival
standpoints, and it should be measured by the standards of performance ad-
equacy typical of each standpoint. Yet, crucially, I also maintain that scientiﬁc
success must be evaluable from other perspectival standpoints. My ﬁnal goal
is to take some preliminary steps toward a view of success across scientiﬁc per-
spectives, which can be faithful to the realist project, while also taking seriously
the challenges coming from the history of science.
Thus, my primary objective in this paper is to clarify how theories (or parts
thereof ) are deemed worthy of being retained across scientiﬁc perspectives, de-
spite the contextual (or perspectival) nature of scientiﬁc success. To achieve this
objective, in section 2 I take a closer look at two inﬂuential tales of compara-
tive success and show their respective shortcomings. In section 3, I present my
perspectivalist take on success from within and clarify how it is meant to im-
prove on the previous two tales.
2. Two Tales of Comparative Success. From which vantage point are
comparative judgments of success made?Whenmaking a judgment of the form
“theory x (or parts thereof ) is more successful than theory y (or parts thereof ),”
comparison is made between x and y against some background or vantage
point, in which (presumably) some standards of performance adequacy s are
embedded.
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My question then is how we should understand this background or van-
tage point at play in judgments of comparative success. I will not be discuss-
ing standards of performance adequacy themselves (although I give a cou-
ple of examples as we go along). Instead, my focus is primarily on how to think
of comparative success (and related judgments we make all the time) in terms
of theory-lineages and historical development. Answering this question is cru-
cial to understanding how scientists go about making success-to-truth infer-
ences in any given historical period and within any given intellectual tradition.
More to the point, answering this question is important to rethinking the real-
ist commitments one may legitimately uphold, despite the situated nature of the
standards of performance adequacy. In this section, I tell the tale of Fresnel’s
success-to-truth inferences twice, by considering two possible answers to my
question above. I give my own tale of Fresnel’s success story in section 3.
Consider Augustin Fresnel submitting his report in 1819 to the Parisian
Académie des Sciences for the prize competition on optical diffraction. The
prize commission included Gay-Lussac, Arago, Biot, Laplace, and Poisson (the
last three being open supporters of Newton’s corpuscularist optics). Fresnel
won the prize competition, despite the skepticism of his judges. Fresnel’s meth-
odological attitude is evident from his motto Natura simplex et fecunda and
other writings: “If this general principle in the philosophy of the physical sci-
ences does not lead immediately to knowledge of the truth, nevertheless it can
direct the efforts of the human spirit, in distancing it from systems which relate
phenomena to too great a number of different causes, and in letting it prefer
thosewhich, supportedon the smallest number of hypotheses, are themost fe-
cund in consequences” (quoted in Grattan-Guinness 1990, 868).
Fresnel’s story is a story of scientiﬁc success amid one of the liveliest scien-
tiﬁc controversies between corpuscularist optics and wave optics. This story has
been read again and again as a story of scientiﬁc success: of structure over sub-
stance, of working posits over idle wheels. I want to retell this story with a dif-
ferent question in mind: namely, by whose standards does it count as a story of
scientiﬁc success? Or, alternatively, from which vantage point are judgments of
comparative success (such as this one) made? And how can they last over time?
2.1. Fresnel’s Tale Number One: Success from Nowhere. Here is a ﬁrst
possible answer. Fresnel’s is a story of scientiﬁc success by the very standards
of “Science.” If we take Science (with a capital S) as the body of scientiﬁc
knowledge, which endeavors to discover nature, Fresnel’s wave theory of
light might be regarded as an integral part of this successful endeavor. I call this
the view of success from nowhere (or, the view of success fromGod’s eye).We
might never be in the position of achieving such complete true knowledge of
nature, but it acts as a regulative idea of scientiﬁc inquiry to assess success and
failure at any given historical time.
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This view of success from nowhere has the advantage of overcoming his-
torical contingencies about why scientiﬁc communities in particular histori-
cal periods came to embrace one theory over another. Individual successes are
assessed against a regulative idea of scientiﬁc success. Thus, it is a comparative
view of scientiﬁc success sub specie aeternitatis, so to speak.Most scientiﬁc real-
ists, I take, have in mind this view of success.
Under this view, one may interpret Fresnel’s self-declared standards of par-
simony in the number of assumptions and fecundity in the consequences as
standards typical of Science. These standards demanded the assent of skep-
tical judges such as Poisson and Biot in 1819, as much as they continue to de-
mand our scientiﬁc assent today. They are standards of success sub specie ae-
ternitatis that invariably lead to the truth (yesterday, today, and tomorrow).
Tempting as it might sound, this view is questionable. Standards for as-
sessing scientiﬁc success (and hence the approximate truth of theories) are sen-
sitive to historical contingencies of real communities in real historical periods.
For example, Fresnel’s appeal to parsimony in the number of assumptions and
fecundity in the consequences is the expression of amethodological view of sci-
ence that emerges in the early nineteenth century, following a long debate among
supporters of David Hartley’s explanationism, Thomas Reid’s empiricism, and
Alain-René Lesage’s hypotheticalism on the speciﬁc role of ether theories (see
Laudan 1981b). From Newton’s Opticks onward, the ether was regarded as
a powerful explanatory mechanism for a variety of phenomena (e.g., from the
transmission of heat to electrical phenomena). A closer look at Fresnel’s work
soon reveals important historical contingencies about the role of the ether mech-
anism in assessing the success of Fresnel’s results at the time.
Consider Fresnel’s appeal to parsimony in the number of assumptions. Far
from an eternal standard of Science, Fresnel (and his contemporaries) under-
stood parsimony as part and parcel of the ether mechanism at work in the ex-
planationof optical phenomena.2TheLaplacians (fromBiot toPoisson) believed
that light propagated mechanically via the emission of corpuscles traveling in
space. Fresnel, by contrast, defended a molecular view of the ether as a medium
that propagated light through the vibrations of ethereal molecules under the
action of central forces (including a repulsive force). It is in this context that
again, 2 years later, in 1821, Fresnel introduced against the Laplacian “geom-
eters” his model of the elastic ether, whose molecules, acting under the laws
of repulsion and conservation of vis viva, vibrated and propagated transverse
light waves. This mechanical model allowed Fresnel to give a “very simple
2. In the 1819 prize essay, Fresnel appealed precisely to the simplicity of his hypothesis
against the very large number of complicated and improbable assumptions that his rival
corpuscularists had to introduce to explain the phenomenon of diffraction (see Buchwald
1989, 172).
THREE TALES OF SCIENTIFIC SUCCESS 761
mechanical explanation of Malus’s law” (quoted from Grattan-Guinness 1990,
879) and of his own earlier work on diffraction.
Fresnel still lacked an exact understanding of the mechanism of interaction
between the ethereal molecules and, say, the Iceland spar, through which light
waves would propagate in double refraction. Ayear later, in 1822, he delivered
a long paper on double refraction (published only in 1827 in the Mémoires, the
same year of Fresnel’s death). The paper presented at the Académie des Sci-
ences appears to have been welcomed by the same Laplace as of “exceptional
importance” (Grattan-Guinness 1990, 896). In it, Fresnel laid down a few sim-
ple assumptions about the velocity of light rays being dependent on planes of
polarization and his mechanical account of the luminous vibrations, among oth-
ers. The goal was to maximize fruitfulness in the results. Indeed, Fresnel could
retrieve his archenemy Biot’s Laplacian analysis of double refraction (which
had been presented at the Académie 3 years earlier, in March 1819; for exten-
sivedetails on thehistoryof Fresnel’s 1822 work, seeBuchwald1989, chap.11).
This was the victory of Fresnel’s ether model over Biot’s corpuscularist optics.
Parsimony in the assumptions concerning (among others) the ether mecha-
nism,3 as well as fruitfulness in the consequences that could be deduced from
them (including Biot’s equations for double refraction), led to Fresnel’s success
in 1822.4More to the point formy story, Fresnel’s appeal to parsimony and fruit-
fulness shows how standards of scientiﬁc success are contextual and perspec-
tival; theyarenot sub specie aeternitatis. Their being situated in agivenhistor-
ical and cultural context (e.g., the debate between corpuscularist optics and
waveoptics at theParisianAcademy in the early1820s) allowshistorical com-
munities to use these standards for assessing the relative success or failure of
the available models at the time and by their own light. That Fresnel was able
to retrieveBiot’ssine-product lawfromsimpleassumptionsabout theethermodel
was success enough for Laplace himself to acknowledge Fresnel’s results.
Success sub specie aeternitatis tries to disentangle the tenselessly true parts
of the theory from the tensed incorrect bits (mostly to do with the ether and
3. Buchwald (1989, 306–10) also stresses, with caveats, the unifying role of the ether at
the time.
4. I do not have the space to pursue in detail this historical point here. But I endorse what
Grattan-Guinness (1990, 898) writes: “Of course, [Fresnel’s] theory was more rich in as-
sumptions than Fresnel had indicated—various principles of mechanics were involved in
the articulation and applications of these principles, together with the particular belief that
the ‘elasticity of the medium’ was proportional to the square of the corresponding radius
vector . . . , an important source of the theorizing in terms of ellipsoids which then follows.
But how brilliant a theory was developed. . . . It was not cast in the Parisian holy writ of
differential equations, not that he seemed to care . . . and the experimental work was con-
ﬁned so far to topaz. But his achievement was remarkable, and fully deserved the compli-
ments of Laplace—who maybe had just become an ex-Laplacian optician?”
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its explanatory role in optical phenomena). But Fresnel’s motto Natura sim-
plex et fecunda did not capture standards of success from nowhere. It expressed
instead a view shared at the time bywave theorists no less than Laplacians about
what counted as a good optical theory by the standards of the time. And at the
time assumptions about luminous vibrations in the ether were legitimately
included in the standard of parsimony (as long as fruitful consequences could
be deduced from them).
The lesson of our ﬁrst tale is the following: standards of scientiﬁc success
are always contextual and perspectival. They are the expression of method-
ological debates and choices of particular communities at particular times. Suc-
cess from nowhere is nobody’s success.
2.2. Fresnel’s Tale Number Two: Success from Here Now. One natural
reply at this point would be to rectify the blanket claim that success is ever
sub specie aeternitatis. For example, one natural option would be to modify the
scope of the claim as a claim concerning us now and our current scientiﬁc
standpoint. After all, no one can claim a God’s-eye view on nature. But we
do have our own current scientiﬁc standpoint, and we judge success and failure
in terms of it. What has lasted long enough in historical terms to reach us
now seems to qualify as successful. Ether theories have long gone from
our textbooks, but Fresnel’s equations are still in our textbooks in some
form. Thus, the former must be false, but the latter must be approximately
true, if they still serve us well.
Under this view of success from here now, success is not a matter of com-
parison with some regulative idea of true complete knowledge of nature. Suc-
cess from here now is our own success, assessed by our own lights and current
standards. Fresnel’s success story then becomes a story of how a partially false
theory still meets standards that we value today so as to count as still approx-
imately true by our own lights. Presumably then, it is not Fresnel’s self-declared
parsimony and fecundity that make his theory still successful to our own eyes
(especially since parsimony for Fresnel included assumptions about the ether
that we now discard as illegitimate idle wheels). Instead, Fresnel’s still counts
as a successful story either because his equations still feature in our textbooks
or because his theory led to Poisson’s novel prediction of the bright spot (and
novel predictions are the sign that the theory must be true). Structural realists
have appealed to the continuity in the mathematical equations; real realists and
selective realists have stressed the novelty of Poisson’s bright spot.
Yet, success from here now needs two caveats. First, our here now is not
itself another variant of success sub specie aeternitatis. Our currently preferred
standards for assessing the success of Fresnel’s theory (be it its mathematical
equations or its novel predictions) are themselves contextual and perspectival.
They do not necessarilymap onto the standards used by Fresnel and contempo-
raries at the time. It is indicative what the historian Grattan-Guinness (1990,
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870) writes about the experimental conﬁrmation of Poisson’s bright spot:
“There was a notable silence over this ﬁnding. Nobody else, whether
undulationist or emissionist, wrote a paper on it or its possible consequences. In
particular, Biot, who had described in his article with Pouillet on diffraction . . .
Maraldi’s somewhat similar ﬁnding (in 1725a, 139) . . . , gave it no mention
in the 1819 edition of the translation of Fischer’s physics textbook or in his
second (1821) edition of his own Précis on physics.” Thus, the novel predic-
tion of the bright spot—impressive and conclusive as it may appear to our
eyes—did not in fact seem to have counted as a standard for assessing the vic-
tory of Fresnel at the time.5
Second, our current standards for assessing the success of Fresnel’s the-
ory are no less provisional and transient thanwere Fresnel’s standards at the time.
Going back to my mundane observation, we judge Fresnel’s theory through the
lenses of Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory, which we still adopt today. But
from here now, Ptolemy’s crystalline spheres and Stahl’s phlogiston all count
as unsuccessful. Yet, the indexical nature of success from here now should also
remind us of the tensed character of such a comparative notion of success,
which gives rise to contradictory judgments. Our success from here now does
not mesh well with success from there then. Success from here now—in the
mouth and hands of medieval scholars—means that Aristotle’s physics and
Ptolemy’s crystalline spheres (among many others) counted as successful (and
hence approximately true). But Aristotle’s physics and Ptolemy’s crystalline
spheres count as false for us now. A scientiﬁc theory cannot be true at one time
and false at another, by the very same comparative notion of success from here
now.
The lesson of our second tale is the following. Success from here now ei-
ther is our own success dressed up as sub specie aeternitatis or, worse, will be
failure from there then.
3. Success from Within and Success-to-Truth Inferences along Perspec-
tivalist Lines. What has gone wrong with our comparative notion of suc-
cess? Can we improve on both success from nowhere and success from here
now? A promising alternative should take on board the contextual nature of
standards of scientiﬁc success, while also avoiding the problems associated
with the indexical nature of success from here now. My suggestion is a view of
scientiﬁc success from within. Scientiﬁc perspectives—I suggest—provide
both contexts of use and contexts of assessment for scientiﬁc knowledge
claims and their respective successes. Success from within is the ability
5. Andreas Baumgartner’s Die Naturlehre in 1824 expressed a similar judgment about
the superiority of Fresnel’s view over the corpuscularist view, which could explain phe-
nomena “only by coercion and additional hypotheses that violate all analogy” (quoted in
Buchwald 1989, 201).
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of a theory to perform adequately with respect to standards that are appro-
priate to the scientiﬁc perspective of the time, when assessed from the point
of view of other scientiﬁc perspectives. I suggest the following deﬁnition
(for more details, please see Massimi 2016a):
A scientiﬁc claim (SC) meets the criterion of success from within iff:
a) SC expresses a proposition p at scientiﬁc perspective SP1
b) p is true (i.e., corresponds to states of affairs in nature) and meets
standards of performance adequacy in SP1 when assessed from other
scientiﬁc perspectives SP2, SP3, SP4 . . .
This deﬁnition of success from within does justice to the realist demand for
tracking nature’s states of affairs (via the ﬁrst part of condition b—i.e., p is true).
In other words, being true is a necessary condition for a scientiﬁc claim to
classify as successful.6 But it is not sufﬁcient (as scientiﬁc realists and other
kinds of realists would have it) because no one is ever in a position of assess-
ing the success of any scientiﬁc claim from a God’s-eye standpoint. Real com-
munities advance judgments of comparative success, in given historical peri-
ods and intellectual contexts. Hence, the second part of condition b captures
the perspectival component in the deﬁnition of success from within. Past
theories ought to be judged in their own terms and by their very own stan-
dards (not by the standards of Science or by our own now). At the same time,
their ongoing performance has to be judged adequate from the point of view
of other (diachronically subsequent) scientiﬁc perspectives.
Success from within forces us to rethink the nature of success-to-truth
inferences along perspectivalist lines. Scientiﬁc perspectives provide the origi-
nal context of use in which relevant standards of performance adequacy are
ﬁrst formulated and deployed. Subsequent scientiﬁc perspectives provide con-
texts of assessment, from which it ought to be possible to evaluate the ongo-
ing performance of past scientiﬁc claims by their own original standards. Given
the richer informational state available to subsequent perspectives, it may be
possible for later assessors to regard the performance adequacy of past scientiﬁc
6. To be clear, I am not suggesting that truth is inferred from success from within by
modus ponens, or in some circular way. It is not the aim of this paper to question the
realist view that success is somehow an indicator of truth. I have taken the realist success-
to-truth inferences on board all along and granted for the purpose of this paper that suc-
cess is an indicator of truth. Instead, my concern in this paper is about the notion of suc-
cess itself and how we go about making comparative judgments about scientiﬁc success.
I part from other varieties of realism in thinking that comparative success should be from
within. Hence, I add to the default truth requirement also a reference to the ongoing per-
formance adequacy of the scientiﬁc knowledge claim at stake across scientiﬁc perspec-
tives.
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claims as lacking in some respects. Hence, it is possible for later assessors to
either retain or withdraw (in whole or in part) past scientiﬁc theories on the
basis of their continuing performance adequacy (or inadequacy). This is
how successful theories (or parts thereof ) evolve in time and get transmitted
in theory-lineages.
Thus, the ability of a scientiﬁc theory (or parts thereof ) to track genuine
states of affairs ultimately establishes whether the theory is approximately
true or not. Yet standards of performance adequacy must also be met, for us
(and our future assessors) to be able to judge the theory as still successful,
and hence for believing it to be approximately true (for further details, see
Massimi 2016b). Our inferences to the approximate truth of past theories (or
parts thereof ) are then—to some extent—due to our commitment as a scien-
tiﬁc community to justiﬁably retain past scientiﬁc claims, whose performance
continues to be adequate by their own original standards when assessed from
later scientiﬁc perspectives.
Fresnel’s optical theory is successful (and hence we believe it to be ap-
proximately true) because its propositional content in terms of periodic prop-
erties of light waves at play in a variety of optical phenomena was true (i.e.,
corresponded to the way in which light waves behave in reality) and it met
standards of performance adequacy in the scientiﬁc perspective at the time.
For example, it provided a simple explanation for optical diffraction (by con-
trast with corpuscularist optics), and it could be fruitfully extended to cover
a range of other optical phenomena (from Biot’s sine-product law for double
refraction to polarization by reﬂection, where the so-called Fresnel’s formu-
lae still feature in our textbooks).
Parsimony in the number of assumptions and fruitfulness in the number
of consequences are just two examples of a much longer list of legitimate sci-
entiﬁc standards of performance adequacy that we today still share with Fres-
nel’s scientiﬁc perspective. That Fresnel’s theory about light waves corre-
sponded to real behavior of light waves is necessary for it to be true. But it
is not sufﬁcient for it to count as (comparatively) successful—to the eyes of
his contemporaries and to our own. For the theory ought to be judged as suc-
cessful by the standards of the scientiﬁc community at the time. And the
judgment of Fresnel’s scientiﬁc community at the time—in the words of
Laplace—continues to be our own judgment today. Fresnel’s optical theory still
satisﬁes the original standards of performance adequacy when assessed
from our current scientiﬁc perspective.
We share with Fresnel’s scientiﬁc perspective the standards of parsimony
and fruitfulness (even if we no longer list assumptions about the ether as par-
simonious, of course). Andwe continue to regard Fresnel’s theory asmeeting
its own standards vis-à-vis its rivals at the time. If we were to eventually stop
regarding Fresnel’s optical theory as meeting these standards (maybe because
we acquire a richer informational state about light wave propagation vis-à-vis
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our understanding of parsimony and fruitfulness), wewould stop reading Fres-
nel’s as a success story.Does itmean that on that dayFresnel’s theorywill end
up in the repository of simply false past theories (in good companywith crys-
talline spheres, andwhat not), even if its propositional content (and the approx-
imate truth of such content) has not changed overnight? Clearly no. The future
scientiﬁc community will reassess whether to retain or withdraw Fresnel’s
theory in the light of its richer informational state about light wave propaga-
tion and its ongoing performance adequacy when assessed by the new scien-
tiﬁc perspective.
Success fromwithin can deliver a resilient perspectival notion of truth across
scientiﬁc perspectives, if we consider scientiﬁc theories in their evolution and
historical lineages. Success from within might well be our best antidote against
both the perennial temptation of a God’s-eye view (which is precluded for us)
and the antirealist caricature of scientiﬁc success slipping through our ﬁngers.
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